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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the role of consumer learning in the demand for recorded music by examining the
impact of an artist’s new album on sales of past and future albums. Using detailed album sales data
for a sample of 355 artists, we show that the release of a new album increases sales of old albums,
and the increase is substantial and permanent—especially if the new release is a hit. Various patterns
in the data suggest the source of the spillover is information: a new release causes some uninformed
consumers to learn about their preferences for the artist’s past albums. These information spillovers
suggest that the high concentration of success across artists may partly result from a lack of
information, and they have significant implications for investment and the structure of contracts
between artists and record labels.
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In entertainment industries such as movies, books, and music, many new products ﬂow into the
market each week. As a result, at any point in time, individual consumers may not know their
preferences for many of the available products or even be aware of their existence. Consequently,
market demand will depend not only on consumer preferences, but also on consumers’ knowledge
of the product space and the process by which they obtain this knowledge. We study this issue in
the market for recorded music by measuring the impact of a new album release on sales of previous
and future albums by the same artist. If consumer learning is important, then the promotional
activity and radio airplay associated with a new release will enhance consumer awareness of the
artist. Some of the newly informed consumers will want to buy the artist’s old albums, leading
to an increase in sales of these albums. We call this effect the backward spillover. The newly
informed consumers also create a larger fan base for the artist’s future albums, raising sales of
these albums (relative to what they would have sold if the current album had never been released).
We call this effect the forward spillover.
We ﬁnd that the backward spillovers are on average positive, permanent, and both statistically
and economically signiﬁcant. Our empirical strategy for quantifying the average spillover is taken
from the literature on treatment effects, but the effect is readily apparent from the album sales
paths. Figure 1 shows two clear examples. The ﬁgure plots the logarithm of weekly national
sales for the ﬁrst and second albums of two popular recording artists, from the time of the artist’s
debut until six months after the artist’s third release. The vertical lines in each graph indicate
the release dates of the second and third albums. In the weeks surrounding these release dates,
sales of catalog titles increased substantially. In the case of the “Bloodhound Gang,” a relatively
obscure alternative rock band, the second album was considerably more popular than the ﬁrst, and
its release catapulted sales of the prior album to levels even higher than it had attained at the time of
its own release. For the “Foo Fighters,” a more popular hard rock band with a very successful debut
album, the impact of the second release was somewhat less dramatic, but stillgenerated an increase
in sales of the band’s ﬁrst album. In both examples, the backward spilloveris signiﬁcantly positive.
The effect appears to begin in the weeks just prior to the new album’s release, and it persists for
many months. In fact, for the “Bloodhound Gang” the effect persisted for at least three years. Note
that while the backward spillovers are clearly visible in the ﬁgure, forward spillovers are difﬁcult
to measure empirically. However, we show that under plausible conditions the backward spillover
2can be a good approximation to the forward spillover.
Our analysis of when and where the backward spillovers are large suggests that the main source
of the spillovers is consumer learning. First, sales of catalog albums start to appear up to four
weeks prior to the release of a new album, which we argue most likely reﬂects consumers learning
about artists from pre-release radio airplay and other promotional activity. Second, the spillovers
are larger when the new release is a hit, and especially large when the new release is a hit and
the catalog album was not, which again is highly suggestive of consumers discovering artists who
were previously unknown. Third, we show that backward spillovers are smaller in an artist’s home
market (i.e., the city where the artist began her career, and where there is presumably a larger
stock of informed consumers), even though sales are on average higher in the home market. Taken
together, these patterns suggest the backward spillover is mainly an information phenomenon:
album releases generate new information, and this information leads some consumers to buy the
artist’s past albums.
This ﬁnding has broad implications for market outcomes. One distinguishing feature of entertain-
ment industries like recorded music is that commercial success tends to be highly concentrated.
Even among proﬁtable albums, the distribution of returns is extremely skewed: a large share of to-
tal industry proﬁt is claimed by a small number of very successful albums, and even fewer artists.
The backward spillover suggests the correlation in consumer choices is not merely a reﬂection of
the products’ relative qualities. The skewness in the distribution of returns partly results from con-
sumers’ lack of information: consumers only learn about the most successful products, so success
is self-reinforcing.
This implication is in line with herding models, such as those proposed by Banerjee [4] and
Bikhchandani et al [8], but there is an important distinction in our case. The presence of unin-
formed consumers implies that many albums are undersold, but it does not necessarily imply that
albums by hit artists are oversold. In the standard herding models, hit albums (and artists) would
sell a lot fewer albums if consumers were fully informed and purchased albums on the basis of
their idiosyncractic preferences rather than popularity. However, music differs from other herding
markets such as books and restaurants. In the latter markets, consumers only observe what is pop-
ular; in music, successful albums get more radio airplay, generating signals that inform consumers
about their own preferences for the album. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that album suc-
cess reinforces itself primarily through radio play: consumers buy only what they hear, and they
3only hear what others buy. If so, then the skewness from consumer learning arises not from hit
albums being oversold, but rather from “good” albums being undersold because (for idiosyncratic
reasons) they do not get very much airplay. This hypothesis also explains why catalog is promoted
indirectly through new releases: many radio stations only play recently released albums.
Another distinguishing feature of entertainment industries is the aspect of joint production: in the
music case, the spillovers occur within the context of a bilateral contracting problem, with the
spillovers affecting the bargaining between artists and their record labels. The backward spillover
generates a lock-in effect which keeps artists from switching labels, and the forward spillover
generates a hold-up problem that can only be solved with long-term contracts. Thus, both types
of spillover (backward and forward) have signiﬁcant implications for investment and help explain
the observed structure of contracts between artists and their record labels. Forward spillovers are
also the central issue in legal disputes that arise when one label’s artist is accused of using material
from an album (not necessarily by that artist) owned by a different label.
We are not aware of prior empirical literature on information spillovers between products,1 but
our theoretical framework is similar to prior work on brand extension. Choi [10], Cabral [9], and
Wernerfelt [22] have developed theoretical models that study the impact of information spillovers
on ﬁrms’ decisions about whether to release new products under existing brand names. When con-
sumers are uncertain about product qualities, the strong reputation of an existing product increases
demand for new products sold under the same brand (the forward spillover), and the release of
a high-quality new product can improve the brand image and boost sales of the existing product
(the backward spillover).2 There is a voluminous theoretical literature on the hold-up problem in
contracts, but we are not aware of any that have studied the effect of backward spillovers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline a simple model of consumer learning,
giveprecise deﬁnitionsofthebackward andforward spillovers,andspecify conditionsunder which
the backward spillover is a good approximation for the forward spillover. Section 3 describes the
data, which consist of weekly album sales histories for a sample of 355 artists. In Section 4 we
describe the empirical strategy for estimating the backward spillover, which is taken from the
literature on treatment effects. Essentially, the release of a new album is the treatment, and we
1Benkard’s[7] studyoflearningbydoingin aircraftproductionshows that learningspills overacross aircrafttypes,
but we have not seen any empirical papers that analyze information spillovers on the demand side of a market.
2In Cabral’s paper,for example, the “feedbackreputationeffect” is exactly analogousto what we call the backward
spillover.
4measure the treatment effect by comparing the sales paths of treated artists to those of a control
group comprised of artists with the same number of catalog albums but who have not yet released
new albums. We use ﬁxed effects to control for time-invariant factors such as genre and artist
popularity that may inﬂuence releases times, and we also estimate a ﬁrst-differenced model that
controls for possible correlation in the shape of the catalog album’s sales path and release times.
Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 tests the model’s predictions. In Section 7 we
discuss the principal implications of our ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
We introduce a two-period, two-album model of information spillovers to clarify the main ideas
and frame the empirical analysis. In period 1, the artist signs a contract with a record label and
produces an album of uncertain quality, which is denoted Z1. (We denote random variables in
upper case, and realizations in lower case.) The label observes an informative signal about Z1 and,
on the basis of this signal, decides whether to invest a ﬁxed amount in marketing the album. If
it does so, then the revenues generated by the album during period 1 are represented by R11.I n
period 2, the label observes the realization r11 and decides whether to exercise its option to ﬁnance
a second album. If it does so, the artist produces a second album of random quality Z2. In period
2, revenues for albums 1 and 2 are R12 and R22, respectively. The album qualities Z1 and Z2
are afﬁliated random variables: an artist that produces one high quality album is more likely to
produce another high quality album. We assume that album price p is constant across time periods
and across albums.
Consumers must learn about an album before making a decision to buy it. Survey evidence indi-
cates that consumers learn their preferences about albums primarily by hearing them on the radio
or by seeing music videos on television, and then sampling albums at listening posts in music
stores.3 Let X1 denote the fraction of radio airplay that album 1 receives in period 1. We assume
that X1 is stochastically increasing in Z1: a higher quality album is more likely to receive radio
airplay. The probability a consumer learns about album 1 depends on the amount of airplay album
3In one national survey of music consumers conducted in 1994 [20] consumers were asked what motivated their
recent music purchases, and the most common response was having heard the music on the radio. A more recent
survey in 2006 [12] produced a similar ﬁnding: 55% of consumers said they learn about new music primarily from
FM radio.
51 receives; here we simply assume that this probability equals x1, the measure of its airplay. In
period 2, X2, the fraction of radio play given to album 2, is likely to depend in part on how well
the ﬁrst album did. Hence, we assume that X2 is stochastically increasing in Z1 and Z2. Note that,
given these assumptions, in both periods, a consumer is more likely to learn about a higher quality
album. For simplicity, we will assume that album 1 receives no airplay in period 2.
Consumers’ preferences are additive across albums, with the utility for album j net of price is
given by
uj = zj − p + εj,
where εj is an idiosyncratic preference shock for album j. The preference shocks are i.i.d. across
consumers, but may be correlated across albums for a given consumer. The joint distribution of
(ε1,ε 2) is assumed to be symmetric with marginal distribution H. A consumer who has learned
about album j buys it if uj is positive.
We assume there is a continuum of consumers, and normalize the size of the market to one. Inte-
grating over consumer demand, ex post revenues in period 1 are given by
r11 = px1[1 − H(p − z1)].
Album demand simply equals the fraction of consumers who are informed about the album and
whose net utility from the album is positive.
In period 2, some consumers who hear the new album are discovering the artist for the ﬁrst time.
We assume that if a consumer learns about the artist in period 2, she learns about both albums—
e.g., if she hears album 2 on the radio in period 2 and likes it, she will also check out the artist’s
previous albums when she visits the music store. Among these newly informed consumers, those
with high enough valuations will purchase the old album, so album 1 revenues in period 2 are
r12 = p(1 − x1)x2[1 − H(p − z1)].
Note that even if consumers “forget” about their preferences for album 1, the fraction of potential
consumers for album 1 is given by the fraction that are learning about the album for the ﬁrst time,
because preferences do not change. We are also implicitly assuming that, in the absence of album
2, no additional consumers would discover album 1, and its sales would be zero in period 2.
6What about sales of album 2? The probability that a consumer learns about album 2 is likely to
depend on what he learned in period 1. The correlations in album qualities and in consumers’
preferences give consumers an incentive to monitor the careers of artists they know, and especially
those they like. This suggests consumers are more likely to learn about album 2 if they learned
their preferences for album 1 in period 1. We make the simplifying assumption that if a consumer
learned about album 1 in period 1, he will learn about album 2 with probability 1—i.e., consumers
whodiscoveredtheartistatalbum1willbeinformedaboutalbum2when itisreleased. Consumers
who did not discover the artist at album 1 will learn their preferences for album 2 with probability
x2. Ex post revenues for album 2 in period 2 are therefore given by
r22 = p(x1 +( 1− x1)x2)[1 − H(p − z2)].
Notice that our assumptions essentially imply that learning is about artists rather than albums. The
fact that the release of album 2 causes some consumers to discover the artist and buy album 1 is
what we call the backward spillover. The backward spillover is measured by r12, since album 1
sales in the counterfactual world in which album 2 is not released are zero. In the empirical model
described below in Section 4 we allow the counterfactual sales to be positive, but the conceptual
framework is the same: we measure the backward spillover as the additional sales of album 1 that
result directly from the release of album 2.
Notice also that consumers who buy the artist’s debut album in period 1 constitute a “fan base”
for the artist’s second album. This is what generates the forward spillover, which we deﬁne as the
difference between album 2 sales in the world where album 1 was released in period 1, versus sales
in the counterfactual world where album 1 was never released. If X2 is independent of Z1 then this
difference would be
p(1 − x2)x1[1 − H(p − z2)].
The forward and backward spillovers therefore mirror each other: the forward spillover of a z
quality album on a z  quality album is equal to the backward spillover of a z quality album on
a z  quality album. This is important because, under the assumptions we have made here, even
if forward spillovers cannot be measured empirically, their magnitudes can be inferred from the
backward spillovers (which can be measured empirically). Moreover, if X2 is stochastically in-
creasing in Z1, this would imply a forward spillover that is even larger than the backward spillover,
since in that case album 1 generates both a fan base effect and an increased airplay effect for album
2.
7To summarize, our simple model of spillovers is based on several key assumptions. First, prices
are constant over time. We do not have any price data for the albums in our sample, so we cannot
verify this assumption directly. However, we did collect price data for a sample of CDs offered
at a major online retailer. Comparing prices for three groups of albums—new releases, catalog
titles by artists with new releases, and catalog titles by artists without new releases—we found that
althoughnew releases tended to be discounted,the price distributionsfor the other two groupswere
indistinguishable. Catalog titles by artists who recently released a new album were no more likely
to be discounted than other catalog titles. According to two retail store managers with whom
we had conversations, even when catalog albums are discounted, the timing of the sales is not
systematically related to new releases by the same artist. A second key assumption is that utility is
additive (or more generally, submodular), which rules out complementarities in consumption.4 We
discuss the plausibility of a model with complementarities after reporting our results. Finally, the
symmetry between forward and backward spillovers implicitly assumes that most of the variation
in sales is due to variation in quality (i.e., Z) and not variation in promotional expenditures, which
are not observable.
3 Data
Our data describe the album sales histories of 355 music artists who were active between 1993 and
2002. Weekly sales data for each artist’s albums were obtained from Nielsen SoundScan, a market
research ﬁrm that tracks musicsales at the pointof sale, essentiallyby monitoringthe cash registers
at over 14,000 retail outlets. SoundScan is the principal source of sales data for the industry, and
is the basis for the ubiquitous Billboard charts that track artist popularity. Various online databases
were also consulted for auxiliary information (e.g., about genres and record labels) and to verify
album release dates.
The samplewasconstructed byﬁrst identifyinga setof candidate artistswho released debutalbums
between 1993 and 2002, which is the period for which SoundScan data were available. Sampling
randomly from the universe of such artists is infeasible, largely because it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd in-
formation on artists who were unsuccessful. Instead, we constructed our sample by looking for
4Following the notation of the model, complementarities could be represented by having mean utility from pur-
chasing both albums 1 and 2 be z1 + z2 + ρz1z2 − 2p, with ρ>0 indexing the strength of the complementarity.
8new artists appearing on Billboard charts. The majority of artists in our sample appeared on Bill-
board’s “Heatseekers” chart, which lists the sales ranking of the top 25 new or ascendant artists
each week.5 A smaller number of artists were found because they appeared on regional “New
Artists” charts, and an even smaller number were identiﬁed as new artists whose debut albums
went straight to the Top 200 chart. This selection is obviously nonrandom: an artist must have
enjoyed at least some small measure of success to be included in the sample. However, although
the sample includes some artists whose ﬁrst appearance on the Heatseekers list was followed by
a rise to stardom, we note (and show in detail below) that it also includes many unknown artists
whose success was modest and/or ﬂeeting. (The weekly sales of the lowest-ranked artist on the
Heatseekers chart is typically around 3,000, which is only a fraction of typical weekly sales for
releases by famous artists who have graduated from the Heatseekers category.)
Because our primary objective is to study demand responses to newly released albums, we restrict
our attentionto majorstudioreleases. Singles, recordings of liveperformances, interviews,holiday
albums, and anthologies or greatest hits albums are excluded from the analysis because they rarely
generate radio airplay and do not contain any new music that could be expected to affect demand
for previous albums.6 The resulting sets of albums were compared against online sources of artist
discographies to verify that we had sales data for each artist’s complete album history; we dropped
any artists for whom albums were missing or for whom the sales data were incomplete.7 Since
timing of releases is an important part of our analysis, we also dropped a small number of artists
with albums for which we could not reliably ascertain a release date.8 Finally, we narrowed the
sample to artists for whom we observe the ﬁrst 52 weeks of sales for at least the ﬁrst two albums;
we then include artists’ third and fourth albums in the analysis if we observe at least the ﬁrst 52
5Artists on the Heatseekers chart are “new” in the sense that they have never before appeared in the overall top 100
of Billboard’s weekly sales chart—i.e., only artists who have never passed that threshold are eligible to be listed as
Heatseekers.
6Greatest hits albums could certainly affect sales of previous albums—repackaging old music would likely can-
nibalize sales of earlier albums—but we are primarily interested in the impact of new music on sales of old music.
Moreover,there are very few artists in our sample that actually released greatest hits albums during the sample period,
making it difﬁcult to estimate their impact with any statistical precision.
7The most common causes for missing data were that a single SoundScan report was missing (e.g., the one con-
taining the ﬁrst few weeks of sales for the album) or that we pulled data for the re-release of an album but failed to
obtain sales for the original release.
8For most albums, the release date listed by SoundScan is clearly correct; however,for some albums the listed date
is inconsistent with the sales pattern (e.g., a large amount of sales reported before the listed release date). In the latter
case, we consulted alternative sources to verify the release date that appeared to be correct based on the sales numbers.
Whenever we could not conﬁdently determine the release date of an album, we dropped it along with all other albums
by the same artist.
9weeks of sales for those albums (i.e., we include third and fourth albums if they were released
before 2002).
After applying all of these ﬁlters, the remaining sample contains 355 artists and 962 albums. The
sample covers three broad genres of music: Rock (227 artists), Rap/R&B/Dance (79 artists), and
Country/Blues (49 artists). The artists in the sample also cover a broad range of commercial
success, from superstars to relative unknowns. Some of the most successful artists in the sample
are Alanis Morissette, the Backstreet Boys, and Shania Twain; examples at the other extreme
include Jupiter Coyote, The Weakerthans, and Melissa Ferrick.
For each album in the sample, we observe weekly sales from the time of its release through the end
of 2002. The key feature of the data is that sales are reported at the album level, so we can observe
the ﬂow of sales for prior albums at the time when a new album is released. Both cross-sectional
and time-series variation can be exploited to measure the sales responses: for any given album, we
can compare its sales path at the time of a new release to that album’s sales history prior to the new
release, and also to the sales paths of albums by other comparable artists who have not released
new albums.
Table 1 summarizes various important aspects of the data. The ﬁrst panel shows the distribution
of the albums’ release dates separately by release number. The median debut date for artists in our
sample is May 1996, with some releasing their ﬁrst albums as early as 1993 and others as late as
2000. There are 74 artists in the sample for whom we observe 4 releases during the sample period,
another 104 for whom we observe 3 releases, and 177 for whom we observe only 2 releases. Note
that while we always observe at least two releases for each artist (due to the sample selection
criteria), if we observe only two we do not know whether the artist’s career died after the second
release or if the third album was (or will be) released after the end of the sample period. In what
follows we will discuss this right-truncation problem whenever it has a material impact on the
analysis.
The second panel of the table illustrates the considerable heterogeneity in sales across albums.
Production, marketing, and distribution costs for a typical album are in the ballpark of $500,000,
so an album must sell roughly 50,000 units (assuming a wholesale price of $10 per unit) in order
to be barely proﬁtable; over half of the albums in our sample passed that threshold in the ﬁrst year.
However, although most of the albums in the sample were nominally successful, the distribution
10of success is highly skewed: as the table illustrates, sales of the most popular albums are orders of
magnitude higher than sales of the least popular ones. For debut albums, for example, ﬁrst-year
sales at the 90th percentile are ten times sales at the median, and over 100 times sales at the 10th
percentile.
The skewness of returns is even greater across artists than across albums, since artist popularity
tends to be somewhat persistent. An artist whose debut album is a hit is likely to also have a hit
with her second album, so absolutedifferences in popularityamong a cohort of artistsare ampliﬁed
over the course of their careers. Across the artists in our sample, the simple correlation between
ﬁrst-year sales of ﬁrst and second releases is 0.52. For second and third (third and fourth) releases
the correlation is 0.77 (0.70). Most of an artist’s popularity appears to derive from artist-speciﬁc
factors rather than album-speciﬁc factors, butthe heterogeneity in success across albumsby a given
artist can still be substantial.
Another interesting feature of the sales distributions is how little they differ by release number.
To the extent that an artist’s popularity grows over time, one might expect later albums to be
increasingly successful commercially. However, while this pattern appears to hold on average for
albums 1 through 3, even for artists who ultimately have very successful careers it is often the case
that the most successful album was the ﬁrst. In our sample, among the 74 artists for whom we
observe four releases, 42 had the greatest success with either the ﬁrst or second release.
Most albums’ sales paths exhibit an early peak followed by a steady, roughly exponential decline.
As indicated in the third and fourth panels of table 1, sales typically peak in the very ﬁrst week
and are heavily front-loaded: a large fraction of the total sales occur in the ﬁrst four weeks after
release. Debut albums are an exception: ﬁrst releases sometimes peak after several weeks, which
presumably reﬂects a more gradual diffusion of information about albums by new artists. The
degree to which sales are front-loaded increases with each successive release.
Seasonal variation in demand for music CDs is substantial. Overall, sales are strongest from late
spring through early fall, and there is a dramatic spike in sales during mid- to late-December. Not
surprisingly, album release dates exhibit some seasonality as well. Table 2 shows the distribution
of releases across months. Late spring through early fall is the most popular time to release a
new album, and record companies appear to avoid releasing new albums in December or January.
Albums that would have been released in late November or December are presumably expedited
11in order to capture the holiday sales period.
The last panel of Table 1 summarizes the delay between album releases. The median elapsed time
before the release of the second album is more than two years, and the low end of the distribution
is still more than one year. The distribution of time between albums 2 and 3 is very similar. Fourth
albums appear to be released more quickly, but this likely reﬂects sample selection. We can only
compute time-to-next-release conditional on there being a next release, and since most of the third
albums in our sample were released near the end of the sample period, we only observe a fourth
release if the time to release was short. This right truncation applies to the other albums as well,
but we do not expect the problem to be as severe in those cases. Figure 2 shows a more complete
picture of the heterogeneity in release lags for adjacent albums. The distribution of elapsed time
between albums 1 and 2 is clearly very similar to the distribution between albums 2 and 3, but the
right truncation is clearly visible in the distribution of elapsed time between albums 3 and 4.
In addition to the obvious right truncation problem, our sample selection is likely to be biased
toward artists whose success came early in their careers. For an artist to be selected into our
sample, it must be the case that (a) the artist appeared on a Billboard chart between 1993-2002,
and (b) we have data on all the artist’s CD sales, which means the artist’s ﬁrst release must have
come after January 1993. Taken together, these conditions imply that artists who hit a Billboard
chart early in the sample period must have done so on their ﬁrst or second album (otherwise we
would have excluded them due to lack of data on their previous releases). Moreover, of the artists
debuting late in our sample period, only the ones with early success will make it into our sample,
because only they will have appeared on a Billboard chart. So the selection pushes toward artists
who start strong. While this means our data will overstate the tendency of artists’ successes to
come early in their careers, we do not see any obvious biases the selection will induce in the
empirical analyses of section 5. Moreover, a quick check of some out-of-sample data suggests the
selection bias is not very severe. We compiled a list of 927 artists who appeared on the Heatseekers
chart between 1997-2002 but who are not included in our sample. Of these artists, 73% made it
to the chart on their ﬁrst or second album, as compared to 87% for the artists in our sample. The
difference is qualitatively consistent with the selection problem described above, but we do not
think the difference is quantitatively large enough to undermine our main results.
124 Empirical Strategy
In this section we discuss our empirical strategy for estimating the backward spillover. Our ap-
proach to estimating the backward spillover is taken from the literature on treatment effects9 and
exploits exogenous variation in albums’ release times. A new album release by an artist is inter-
preted as the “treatment.” Releasing a new album is an irreversible act: once treated, the catalog
albums remain treated. We will follow the impact of a new release on sales of catalog albums for S
periods, and refer to this number as the length of the treatment “window.” (In the models estimated
below, S is 39 weeks: 13 pre- and 26 post-treatment.)
Without loss of generality, we focus on the ﬁrst treatment episode: the release of album 2 and its
impact on sales of album 1. Let y0
it denote the log of album 1 sales of artist i in period t without
treatment, and let ys
it denote the log of album 1 sales in period t when artist i is in the sth period
of treatment. Time (t) is measured in terms of the number of periods since album 1 was released.
Our objective is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATE) for each period of the
treatment window. We focus on the treatment effect on the treated because of the right truncation
problems that are present in our sample.
Notice that, by taking logs, we are implicitly assuming that treatment effects are proportional, not
additive. There are two reasons for adopting thisspeciﬁcation. One is that the distributionof album
sales is highlyskewed. The other is that the average treatment effect is likely to be nonlinear: a new
release has a larger impact on total sales of catalog titles for more popular artists. By measuring the
treatment effect in proportional terms, we capture some of this nonlinearity. However, it could bias
our estimates of the treatment effects upwards since proportionate effects are likely to be higher for
less popular artists, and there are many more of them. Proportionate effects may also be higher for
popular artists who are treated later since their sales levels are likely to be a lot lower than popular
artists who are treated earlier. We address these issues in discussing the results below.
The main challenge in estimating the ATE is that, in each period, we observe only one outcome for











9See Wooldridge [23] for a summary.
13where wi,t−s+1 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if artist i enters treatment in period
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Here μs is the mean of the distribution of log sales in time period t for artists in the sth period of
treatment, φ(t) is a function that that captures the common, downward trend in an artist’s sales,
νi measures the impact of unobserved artist characteristics on sales in every period, and vs
it is the
idiosyncratic shock to album 1 sales of artist i when she is in treatment period s at time period
t. The artist-speciﬁc effect does not vary across the treatment window. Substituting the above
equations, the observed outcome for artist i in period t is given by
yit = μ












The ATE for treatment period s is the difference in means, μs − μ0.
Intuitively, our strategy for measuring this difference is to use the sales of not-yet-treated albums
(i.e., albums whose artists have not yet released a newer album) as the benchmark against which
to compare sales of treated albums (i.e., albums whose artists have recently released new albums).
Our speciﬁc sampling and estimation procedure is as follows. For each artist, t indexes time since
the debut album’s release, not calendar time. Albums are included in the sample only until the last
period of the treatment window: observations on sales after that window are not used in estimating
the regressions. We adopt this approach to ensure that, at any given t, treated albums are being
compared with not-yet-treated albums, rather than a mix of not-yet-treated and previously-treated
albums. Thus, the sample in period t includes artists that have not yet released a new album and
artists who had a new release in periods t−1,t−2,.., or t−S +1but excludes artists whose new
release occurred prior to period t − S +1 . Basically, we want the control group to measure what
happens to sales over time before any new albums are released: our approach assumes that for an
album whose artist issues a new release at t, counterfactual sales (i.e., what sales would have been
in the absence of the new release) can be inferred from the sales of all other albums at t for which
there has not yet been a new release.10
The regression model is as follows:
10We believe dropping post-treatment observations is the most appropriate approach, but it turns out not to matter
very much: our estimates change very little if we include these observations.










it +  it, (1)
where αi is an artist ﬁxed effect, the λt’s are time dummies, and the Dm’s are month-of-year
dummies (to control for seasonality).11 Here Is
it is an indicator equal to one if the release of artist
i’s new album was s weeks away from period t,s oβs measures the new album’s sales impact in
week s of the treatment window. (t =0corresponds to the ﬁrst week following the new release.)
Intuitively, after accounting for time and artist ﬁxed effects, we compute the difference in the
average sales of album 1 between artists in treatment period s and artists who are not treated for
each period, and then average these differences across the time periods. The stochastic error,  it,
is assumed to be heteroskedastic across i (some artists’ sales are more volatile than others’) and
autocorrelated within i (random shocks to an artist’s sales are persistent over time). The time
dummies (λt) allow for a ﬂexible decay path of sales, but implicitly we are assuming that the
shape of this decay path is the same across albums: although differences in the level of demand are
captured by the album ﬁxed effects, differences in the shapes of albums’ sales paths are necessarily
part of the error ( ).
Including separate indicators for successive weeks of treatment allows us to check whether the
new release’s impact diminishes (or even reverses) over time, which is important for determining
whether the effects reﬂect intertemporal demand shifts. We allow for a 39-week treatment window,
beginning 13 weeks (3 months) before the release of the new album. The pre-release periods are
included for two reasons. First, much of the promotional activity surrounding the release of a new
album occurs in the weeks leading up to the release, and we want to allow for the possibility that
the backward spillover reﬂects consumers’ responses to these pre-release marketing campaigns.
In some cases labels release singles from the new album in advance of the album itself, so that
pre-release effects could also reﬂect advance airplay of the album’s songs.12 Second, including
pre-release dummies serves as a reality check: we consider it rather implausible that a new album
could have an impact on prior albums’ sales many months in advance of its actual release, so if the
11The results reported below are essentially unchanged if we control for seasonality with week-of-year dummies
instead of month-of-yeardummies.
12One might wonder whether the relevant event is the release of the single or the release of the album. Although we
have data on when singles were released for sale, this does not correspond reliably with the timing of the release on
the radio. Radio stations are given advance copies of albums to be played on the air, and a given single may be played
on the radio long before it is released for sale in stores. Moreover,even when a single has been released in advance of
the album, the label’s promotional activity is still focused around the release date of the album.
15estimated effects of the pre-release dummies are statistical zeros for months far enough back, we
can interpret this as an indirect validation of our empirical model.
For the regression described above to yield consistent estimates of the treatment effect, the critical
assumption is that the treatment indicators in a period are independent of the idiosyncratic sales
shocks in that period. In other words, after controlling for time-invariant characteristics such as
genre and artist quality that affect the level of sales in each period, we need the treatment to be
random across artists. This is a strong but not implausible assumption. We suspect that the main
factor determining the time between releases is the creative process, which is arguably exogenous
totime-varyingfactors. Developingnewmusicrequiresideas, coordination,andeffort, allofwhich
are subject to the vagaries of the artist’s moods and incentives. To better understand the sources
of variation in release times, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models with various album and
artist characteristics included as covariates. Table 3 presents the results. Somewhat surprisingly,
the time it takes to release an artist’s new album is essentially independent of the success of the
prior album (as measured by ﬁrst six months’ sales) and of its decline rate after conditioning on
genre. Release lags are signiﬁcantly shorter for Country artists, and the coefﬁcients on “years
since 1993” reveal a general time trend toward longer lags between second and third (and third and
fourth) albums.
Nevertheless, the speciﬁc question for our analysis is whether release times depend on the sales
patterns of previous albums in ways that album ﬁxed effects cannot control. One possibility is that
release times are related to the shape of the previous album’s sales path. Although the insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients on the decline rate variable in Table 3 seem to suggest that release times are unrelated
to decline rates, subtle relationships between sales-path shapes and release times may still exist.
For example, albums of artists that spend relatively more effort promoting the current album in
live tours and other engagements will tend to have “longer legs” (i.e., slower decline rates) and
later release times than albums of artists that spend more time working on the new album. It is
also possible that release times vary for strategic reasons. If the current release is not a hit, record
companies may delay investing in a new release until more information becomes available. In
some cases artists may delay the production of new music as a bargaining tactic.13 Whatever the
reason for the relationship between the shape of the sales path and the time to the next release,
13Most recording contracts grant the record company an option to produce future albums by the artist under the
same terms as applied to previous albums. Artists’ leverage for negotiating more favorable terms in these contracts
derives partly from a threat to withhold new music.
16the potential problem is that our regression only controls for the average rate of decline in album
sales, so our estimates of the treatment effect will be biased if deviations from that average are
systematically related to release times.
In order to address this issue, we can estimate the regression model of equation (1) using the ﬁrst
difference of ln(sales) as the dependent variable: i.e., we estimate










it +  it , (2)
where Δyit ≡ yit − yit−1. This model estimates the impact of new releases on the percentage rate
of change (from week to week) in previous albums’ sales. The advantage of this speciﬁcation is
that heterogeneity in sales levels is still accounted for (the ﬁrst differencing sweeps it out), and
the ﬁxed effects,  αi, now control for unobserved heterogeneity in albums’ decline rates. Taking
this heterogeneity out of the error term mitigates concerns about the endogeneity of treatment with
respect to the shape of an album’s sales path.
5 Results
We estimate the regressions in (1) and (2) separately for each of three “treatments:” the impact
of the second, third, and fourth releases on sales of the previous album.14 In constructing the
samples for estimating the regression we impose several restrictions. First, we exclude the ﬁrst
eight months of albums’ sales histories, in order to avoid having to model heterogeneity in early
time paths. Recall that although most albums peak very early and then decline monotonically, for
some “sleeper” albums we do observe accelerating sales over the ﬁrst few months. By starting
our sample at eight months, we ensure that the vast majority of albums have already reached their
sales peaks, so that the λt’s have a better chance at controlling for the decay dynamics. A second
restriction involves truncating the other end of the sales histories: we exclude sales occurring more
than four years beyond the relevant starting point. This means that if an artist’s second album was
released more than four years after the ﬁrst, then that artist is not included in the estimation of the
impact of second releases on ﬁrst albums, and (similarly) if an artist’s third release came more than
14Here we report results only for adjacent album pairs, but we have also measured the impact for non-adjacentpairs
(e.g., the impact of album 3’s release on sales of album 1). The effects for non-adjacent pairs are positive, statistically
signiﬁcant, and persistent, but slightly smaller than for adjacent album pairs.
17four years after the second, then that artist is excluded from the regressions estimating the impact
of album 3 on album 2.
Table 4 presents estimates of the regressions (1) and (2), with standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity across artists and serial correlation within artists. (Estimated AR(1) coefﬁcients are
listed at the bottom of the table.) The columns of the table represent different treatment episodes
(album pairs), and the rows of the table list the estimated effects for the 39 weeks of the treatment
window (i.e., the ˆ βs’s). Since the dependent variable is the logarithm of sales, the coefﬁcients for
speciﬁcation (1) can be interpreted as approximate percentage changes in sales resulting from the
new release, and for speciﬁcation (2) they represent effects on the percentage rate of change in
sales from week to week. The number of coefﬁcients listed in Table 4 makes it somewhat difﬁcult
to read, so we summarize the results graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the estimated
effects from speciﬁcation (1), along with 95% conﬁdence bands, for each of the album pairs. As
can be seen in the ﬁgure, the estimates of the effects for each of the weeks following the release of
a new album are always positive, substantive, and statistically signiﬁcant. The largest spillover is
between albums 2 and 1, with estimates ranging between 40-55%. The spillovers for the remain-
ing pairs of albums are smaller, ranging mostly between 15-30%. Figure 4 shows a comparison of
the results from the two speciﬁcations. The solid line plots the cumulative impact implied by the
estimated weekly coefﬁcients from the ﬁrst-differenced model (2), and the dashed line indicates
the estimated effects from the levels regression (1). The implied effects are qualitatively and quan-
titatively very similar, which we interpret as reassuring evidence that our results are driven by real
effects, not by subtle correlations between current sales ﬂows and the timing of new releases.15
In each treatment episode, the estimated impact of the new album three months prior to its ac-
tual release is statistically indistinguishable from zero. As discussed above, this provides some
reassurance about the model’s assumptions: three months prior to the treatment, the sales of soon-
to-be-treated albums are statistically indistinguishable from control albums (after conditioning on
album ﬁxed effects and seasonal effects). In general, small (but statistically signiﬁcant) increases
start showing up 4-8 weeks prior to the new album’s release, growing in magnitude until the week
15We also checked the robustness of the estimates by splitting the sample in each treatment based on the median
treatment time. As expected, the patterns are the same but the estimated effects are smaller for the albums that are
treated early and larger for albums treated later. (This pattern makes sense because our model assumes the effects
are proportional: albums treated later will tend to have lower sales ﬂows at the time of treatment, so the proportional
impact of the new release will tend to be larger than for albums with high sales ﬂows.) The estimates are always
strongly signiﬁcant.
18of the release (t =0in the table), at which point there is a substantial spike upward in sales.
As mentioned previously, the pre-release effects most likely reﬂect promotional activity and radio
airplay that occurs prior to the new album’s release in stores. As a simple check, we estimated the
regressions separately for artists who released singles in advance of the new album vs. artists who
released singles after the release of the album. (Of the album releases represented in our sample,
23% were preceded by the release of a single, while another 16% had single releases occurring
after the album release.) The pre-release effects on the catalog album’s sales are much larger
for the artists with advance singles,16 which is consistent with the idea that these effects reﬂect
consumer responses to the information ﬂows associated with promotion and airplay.
The estimated effects are remarkably persistent: especially for the impact of album 2 on album 1,
the spillovers do not appear to be transitory. It is important to note, however, that the increasing
coefﬁcients in some speciﬁcations do not imply ever-increasing sales paths, since the treatment
effects in general do not dominate the underlying decay trend in sales. (In order to save space,
the table does not list the estimated time dummies, which reveal a steady and almost perfectly
monotonic decline over time.)
The main conclusion that we draw from the above results is that the backward spillover is on
average signiﬁcantly positive and permanent. There is no evidence of new albums cannibalizing
sales of catalog albums or of new albums shifting demand for catalog albums from future periods
towards the release period. The “buzz” and increased airplay around the time of a new release
could accelerate the arrival of consumers at the store. If these consumers are ones who would have
eventuallypurchasedthecatalogtitleanyway(i.e., evenifthenewalbumwereneverreleased), then
the increases in sales would be transitory and eventually the spillover would become negative. We
have tried longer treatment windows. In some cases, the treatment effect does die out eventually
but in none of the cases does the treatment effect turn negative. Thus, the release of a new album
generates permanent increases in demand for past albums, inducing purchases by customers who
would not have otherwise purchased.
16For example, artists with pre-album singles had roughly 30-40% sales increases of album 1 in the three weeks
prior to the release of album 2, while artists with post-album singles had increases of 5-20%.
196 Predictions
Our model predicts that the backward spillover will be smaller when more consumers know about
the artist. We test this prediction in two ways. First, we examine how the backward spillover
varies with the catalog album’s success and the new album’s success. Holding constant the success
of the catalog album, the backward spillover should be larger if the new album is a hit, because
uninformed consumers will be more likely to hear it, like it, and like the catalog album as well. It
will be especially large when the catalog album was not a success because in this case the stock
of uninformed consumers is quite large. Second, we examine geographic variation: i.e., instead
of comparing national sales across artists, we can compare sales across markets for a given artist.
An especially informative comparison is between an artist’s home market (i.e., the city where the
artist’s career began) and other markets. Because new artists tend to have geographically limited
concert tours—in many cases performing only in local clubs—artists in their early careers can
be popular in their home markets while still relatively unknown on a national scale. If consumer
learning is driving the backward spillovers, we should observe smaller spillovers in the artist’s
home market than in other markets.
6.1 Hits Versus Non-Hits
We split our sample depending on whether or not albums were “hits.” We deﬁne a hit as an al-
bum that sold 250,000 units or more in its ﬁrst year; 30% of the albums in our sample meet this
criterion.17 We then divide our sample into four categories—hits followed by hits, hits followed
by non-hits, non-hits followed by hits, and non-hits followed by non-hits—and summarize the
backward spillovers for each of the four categories in Table 5.
The table is based on estimates of the regression model computed separately for each subgroup.18
These are then used to calculate the implied total change in sales for the “median” album. Specif-
ically, we calculate the median weekly sales 14 weeks prior to the median release time, and the
median weekly decline over the 39 weeks that follow. (In these calculations, we use only albums
17As a point of reference, the RIAA certiﬁes albums as “Gold” if they sell more than 500,000 units. Also, among
the albums we categorize as hits, at least 90% had peak sales high enough to appear on Billboard’s Top 200 chart (vs.
less than 10% among those we categorize as non-hits).
18We use the ﬁrst-differencesmodelin equation(2). Some ofthe estimatedsales increasesare smallerif we estimate
the model in levels, but the qualitative patterns are essentially the same.
20whose artists have not yet released the next album, so that the median sales ﬂows and median de-
cline rates will not reﬂect any of the backward spillovers.) For example, in the group of 53 artists
whose ﬁrst two albums were both hits, the median time between the ﬁrst and second releases is
108 weeks. Among ﬁrst albums for which there was not yet a second release, the median weekly
sales at week 94 (=108-14) was 1,888, and the median decline rate over weeks 95-134 was 2.1%
per week. So we take a hypothetical album, with weekly sales beginning at 1,888 and declining at
2.1% per week, and apply the percentage increases implied by our estimated coefﬁcients. The pre-
dicted total increase in sales over the 39-week period is 22,161, or roughly $350,000 in additional
revenues (again using a rough price of $16 per unit).
The patterns in Table 5 are consistent with the predictions of our model. The backward spillover
is always larger when the new album is a hit, whether the previous album was a non-hit or a hit.
The largest percentage increase occurs when a non-hit album is followed by a hit: for an artist
whose second album was her ﬁrst hit, we estimate that weekly sales of her ﬁrst album more than
double when the new album is released. We interpret this as reﬂecting such artists’ larger stock of
uninformed consumers and higher quality second albums.19 The smallest increase occurs when a
hit is followed by a non-hit—i.e., when the stock of uninformed consumers is low and the quality
of the new album is low.
The same patterns hold when we examine the impact of the third release on the sales of album 2.
The spillovers are large when the new album is a hit, but negligible otherwise. The numbers are
slightly smaller than those for the previous album, which could be interpreted to reﬂect a shrinking
stock of uninformed consumers. (By the time a third album is released, a larger fraction of an
artist’s potential market has become aware of or familiar with the artist’s music.)
An important lesson from Table 5 is that although on average (across all types of albums) the
backward spillovers are of modest economic signiﬁcance, they are in fact quite large for the artists
that matter: those who have hits or have the potential to produce hits. This implies that if the
artist’s next release has the potential to be a hit, then the backward spillover will have a meaningful
impact on the contracting relationship between artist and record label. On the other hand, if it is
clear that the artist’s career has peaked, or that most of the artist’s potential market is already aware
of the artist, then no spillover will be expected.
19Recall that due to the forward spillover, it takes a higher intrinsic quality to generate a hit following a non-hit than
a hit following a hit.
21Indirect evidence of forward spillovers can be seen in albums’ decline rates. Table 7 reports the
ratio of sales in the ﬁrst month to sales in the ﬁrst year of a new release for each of four different
success patterns (two hits, a hit followed by a non-hit, etc.). The ratio is a simple measure of how
front-loaded an album’s sales are. Sales of new albums should be considerably more front-loaded
when the previous album was a hit, because in that case there is a large stock of consumers in the
market who are aware of the artist and his music. Assuming these consumers make their purchase
decisions regarding the new album more quickly than uninformed consumers (e.g., because they
know about the release date and visit the music store sooner thereafter), they will cause sales of
the new album to be more front-loaded; so the more successful the previous album, the more front-
loaded will be the sales of the new album. This is exactly the pattern shown in Table 7. For both
second and third releases, sales are signiﬁcantly more front-loaded when the previous album was
a hit. Also, sales are the least front-loaded for hit albums that were preceded by non-hits, which
suggests success may diffuse more slowly when most consumers were previously unaware of the
artist.
Recall that in section 2 we argued that if the variation in sales across albums is due mostly to
quality rather than promotion—i.e., if an album’s success depends on its Z, and not on variable
investments made by the record label—then the backward spillover can be a lower bound on the
forward spillover.20 In terms of the binary classiﬁcation, the forward spillover from a hit catalog
album to a hit new album is approximately equal to the backward spillover from a hit new album
to a hit catalog album; similarly, the forward spillover of a hit catalog album to a non-hit new
album is approximately equal to the backward spillover from a hit new album to a non-hit catalog
album. Table 5 indicates that the magnitudes of the backward spillovers in these two cases are
substantial. We conclude that the forward spillovers in the associated cases are similar and hence
also signiﬁcant.
6.2 Home Versus Non-Home Markets
We were able to determine the city of origin for 325 of the 339 artists included in the regression
analysis of Table 4; 268 of these artists originated in the U.S., so we can observe sales in the home
20We do not directly observe investment levels or album quality so we cannot separately measure the impact of
these two inputs on sales. However, we believe that the long-term success of an album is plausibly more a function of
its quality than of the label’s marketing expenditures.
22market and compare them to sales in other markets across the nation. SoundScan reports album
sales separately for 100 Designated Market Areas (DMAs), each one corresponding to a major
metropolitan area such as Los Angeles or Boston. We determined each artist’s city of origin, and
labeled the nearest DMA to be the artist’s home market.21 It is easy to verify that artists are indeed
more popular in their home markets: over 80% of debut albums had disproportionately high sales
in the artist’s home market, meaning that the home market’s share of national ﬁrst-year sales was
higher than the typical share for other artists of the same genre. On average, the home market’s
share of national sales was 8 percentage points larger than would have been predicted based on
that market’s share of overall sales within the artist’s genre.
Are backwardspilloverssmallerinartists’homemarkets? Usingthemarket-leveldata, weestimate
a variant of the regression model in (1):

















where yimt islogsales ofartist i’salbuminmarket minweek t; G
g
i isa dummyequal toone if artist
i is in genre g (so the θgm’s are market×genre ﬁxed effects); the Dk
it’s are month-of-year dummies,
the Is
it’s are the treatment dummies, and Him equals one if market m is artist i’s home market.
The key differences between this model and the one described in equation (1) are that (i) we use
market-level sales data, and control for heterogeneity in sales across markets using market×genre
ﬁxed effects;22 (ii) we measure whether sales are on average higher in the artist’s home market
(i.e., the parameter ψ); and (iii) we allow the spillover effects to differ for home markets vs. other
markets (via the parameter γ).
Table 6 reports the key estimates for three album pairs. The estimates of ψ conﬁrm that on average
sales are much higher in an artist’shome market than in other markets. For the debut album, the co-
efﬁcient of 0.814 impliesthat sales are overtwice as high in the home market than in other markets,
other things being equal. Notably, the home market advantage is smaller for later albums, which
21Roughly 20% of the artists are solo artists, and for these we were only able to ﬁnd the city of birth—which is
not necessarily the city in which the artist ﬁrst began performing. However, it is plausible that solo artists are more
well-known in their birth cities than in other cities nationwide, even if they began their performing careers elsewhere.
In any case, all of our analyses deliver the same conclusions if we exclude solo artists.
22Note that we can alternatively include market×artist ﬁxed effects. Doing so means we cannot estimate ψ, the
coefﬁcient on Him, because Him is collinear with the market×artist effect for the home market. Adopting this
speciﬁcation yields results for all the other parameters that are virtually identical to those we report for the model
with market×genre effects.
23is consistent with the notion that awareness of the artist becomes less geographically concentrated
as the the artist’s career progresses.
In spite of the fact that artists’ albums are on average more successful in their home markets,
the backward spillovers are on average smaller in home markets. The estimates of γ are similar
across the album pairs, indicating that backward spillovers are 10-14 percentage points smaller in
an artist’s home market than in other markets. We interpret this as evidence in support of learning
models. Relative to other markets, home markets have smaller stocks of uninformed consumers—
potential buyers are already familiar with the artist—so the new album generates fewer additional
sales of the catalog title.
6.3 Alternative explanations
Another potential model of the backward spillovers is one in which consumers have supermodular
preferences over albums. If owning one album by an artist increases the marginal utility from pur-
chasing other albums by that artist, then the backward spillovercan occur because some consumers
who were previously not willing to buy catalog album are willing to do so when it is bundled with
the new album. Like the learning model, complementarities in consumption would predict per-
sistent backward spillovers, since in both cases the new release directly changes the probability
of wanting to purchase the catalog album. The pre-release effects would have to be interpreted
as purchases by consumers who anticipate buying the new album when it is released. That is,
even though the beneﬁts of joint consumption cannot be obtained until both albums are available,
the consumer decides to buy the catalog album immediately to obtain the additional beneﬁts of
consuming the catalog album before the new release. Note that the complementarities could be
interpreted as a characterization of fans: e.g., when consumers listen regularly to an artist’s music,
they become accustomed to it or invested in the image associated with it, and therefore more likely
to purchase more music from that artist.23
The predictions of a preference complementarity model would depend on how the distribution of
preferences in the population varies across markets. The fact that artists tend to be more successful
intheirhomemarketscouldbeexplainedas aselectioneffect, butthemagnitudeseemsimplausibly
23Becker, Grossman, and Murphy [5] used a model with complementarities to describe cigarette addiction. Speciﬁ-
cally, utility is u(ct,c t−1), with a positive cross-partial.
24large. A similar issue arises when trying to explain why the backward spillover is smaller in an
artist’s home market. Even for big hits, sales of any single album reﬂect a small fraction of the
number of potential consumers—i.e., those in the right tail of the distribution. This suggests that if
sales of a given album are high, then backward spillovers for that album will also be high, because
there will be a higher density of consumers with reservation prices near the margin. However, we
observe the opposite when we examine artists’ home markets: sales are higher in the home market,
but spillovers are smaller. In order to explain this pattern, one would have to argue that preference
complementarities operate differently in artists’ home markets than in other markets, or that the
distribution of preferences is such that high levels of sales can be consistent with a low density of
consumers near the margin.24
We think such explanations are rather implausible, but we cannot rule them out entirely. A more
direct way to check for supermodular preferences would be to see whether consumer purchases
of catalog albums are typically bundled with purchases of new albums. Unfortunately, we do not
have data on individual consumers’ purchases, which could in principle allow us to quantify the
relative importance of learning and complementarities. Other studies of consumer learning have
used consumer-level data to draw sharper distinctions between competing hypotheses or to quan-
tify the relative importance of alternative models. For example, Ackerberg [1] [2] used data on
yogurt purchases by a panel of households in combination with data on advertising exposure to
distinguish the informative vs. prestige effects of advertising. Crawford and Shum [11] use con-
sumer panel data to estimate a structural model measuring the effects of uncertainty and learning
on prescription choices and treatment outcomes for anti-ulcer drugs. They infer the importance of
consumer learning essentially by comparing initial drug choices to drug choices made later on, in
combination with data on patient recovery. An interesting similarity to our results is their ﬁnding
that the drugs’ market shares would be much less concentrated if patients were fully informed
about their match values with the various drugs.
24As long as albumpurchasesare tail events, almost any ordinarydistribution(e.g., exponential,normal,lognormal)
would imply the opposite: high levels of sales imply a high density of consumers near the margin.
257 Discussion
What does the backward spillover imply about the efﬁciency of consumer choices? In the context
of our model, the backward spillovermeansthat manyalbumsare undersold,in the sense thatmany
would-be buyers remain uninformed. This is especially true of debut albums in non-home markets.
Of course, if an artist produces a hit album that gets a lot of radio airplay, then more consumers will
learn about the artist and some of the lost catalog sales will be recovered. But the situation is quite
different for artists who produce mediocre albums or albums that serve niche markets. Consumers
have a more difﬁcult time learning about these artists because their albums may get little or no
airplay. Furthermore, their careers are more likely to be truncated due to low sales. For example,
if an artist’s ﬁrst two albums are only moderately successful, her label may decline to produce any
future albums—even though with full information the artist would eventually become a success.25
Hence, market learning on non-hit artists will tend to be incomplete and their albums undersold.
On the other hand, hit albums are unlikely to be oversold. In the standard herding model, con-
sumers rationally ignore their own information to follow the herd: they buy what others buy. If
consumers behave this way in the market for music, it would imply that not only are some al-
bums undersold, but others are oversold. However, the latter phenomenon may be less relevant for
recorded music. In markets such as restaurants and books, potential consumers only observe what
other consumers buy, so they draw inferences about a product’s qualityonly from the knowledge of
its overall popularity. But, in music, when other consumers buy an album, the songs on that album
get played more frequently on the radio, generating signals that inform consumers’ about their own
preferences for the album. As a result, consumers are less likely to herd on a bad album.26 If, in
addition, preferences are additive across albums by the same artist and across artists, then there is
no meaningful substitution between albums. Artists may sell fewer albums than they would in the
but-for world of complete information, but they do not lose sales to other albums.
The broad implication is that the distribution of sales in music is signiﬁcantly more concentrated
than it would be in the but-for-world of complete information. In other words, the high con-
centration of returns across artists partly reﬂects the way in which consumers learn about their
25We do not mean to suggest that all unsuccessful artists are potential stars, but rather that some potential stars’
careers may be truncated because consumers were unaware of their music.
26This may partly explain why book sales are much more skewed than music sales. (See Sorensen [19] for some
evidence and discussion of the skewed distribution of sales for hardcover ﬁction.)
26preferences rather than their actual preferences.27 Indeed, we suspect that the skewness in album
sales largely reﬂects the skewness in radio airplay. If consumers in music markets buy only what
they hear, and they hear only what others buy, then success reinforces itself, which generates a
more skewed distribution of sales.28 An interesting implication is that lower costs of acquiring
information about albums (e.g., due to sharing and sampling of music on the internet) should make
it easier for artists to become known, and since this has a disproportionate impact on lesser-known
(i.e., less successful) artists, it would tend to make sales less concentrated across artists.
What does the backward spillover imply about investment in artists? The standard recording artist
contract is a “work-for-hire” agreement, so the label owns the recording rights on albums.29 The
label pays the artist an advance to cover studio costs and “living costs,” and the artist agrees to
produce an album. After the artist delivers the album, the label decides whether to release it and
howmuchto investinmarketingand promotion.30 Theinvestmentdecisioniscontingentonprivate
information that is not veriﬁable and hence not contractible. The backward spilloverimplies that in
order to ensure that investmentsin the new album are efﬁcient, the rights on catalog albums have to
be bundled with the rights on the new album. Otherwise, the label that owns the recording rights to
the new album will not internalize the impact of its investment on sales of catalog. The incumbent
label, who owns the recording rights to catalog, will have an advantage in bidding for the rights
to the new album: it is willing to invest more and pay more for those rights than an outside label.
Thus, the backward spillovertends to lock in the artist. However, it can be shownthat the backward
spillover by itself does not lead to inefﬁciencies in investment, nor does it necessitate long-term
contracts.31 Intuitively, when the label invests in the artist’s debut album (and every subsequent
album), it anticipates winning the rights to future albums and earning the rents associated with the
27Herding and other information-based models are not the only models that predict endogenously skewed market
returns. Forexample,Beckerand Murphy[6] proposea class ofmodelsin whichsocial multipliereffectsarise because
a product’s popularity increases the consumer’s marginal utility of consumption, due perhaps to network effects in
consumption. Such models cannot easily explain the patterns we observe in the backward spillovers, but they may be
an additional source of skewness in the demand for music.
28Sorensen [19] documents a similar phenomenon of success breeding success in the market for books: appearing
on the New York Times bestseller list has a direct positive impact on sales. The effect is negligible for well-known
authors, but quite large for debut authors—a result that parallels the ﬁnding here that backward spillovers are largest
when a hit new album is released by a relatively unknown artist.
29See Krasilovskyet al’s [16] book on contracts in the music industry for more details. In some rare cases the artists
negotiate reversions—i.e., ownership of the recording rights reverts to the artist after some period of time.
30Labels typically spend between $250,000 to $500,000 on marketing and promotion. The typical advance for a
debut album is usually around $150,000.
31In a previous version of this paper we described a formal model of contracting. It is available from the authors
upon request.
27backward spillover.
By giving the incumbent label a bidding advantage, the backward spillover may present a barrier
to entry. Entrant labels cannot internalize the spillover, so they are at a disadvantage whenever the
spillover is likely to be important. Our results suggest that an entrant can successfully bid for new
releases of artists whose careers are on the decline, but not for new releases by artists whose careers
are on the rise. This is not a good situation for the entrant, particularly if the incumbent label is
better able to forecast the artist’s peak. In principle, the entrant could try to internalize the spillover
by purchasing the rights to the artist’s catalog from the incumbent label. Major distributors such
as Sony, Time-Warner, BMG, Universal, and EMI adopted this strategy when they decided to
vertically integrate backwards into the production of music: instead of bidding for the rights to
new albums, they effectively purchased the recording rights to catalog by buying labels. However,
as a matter of practice, the major distributors never sell catalog rights. The reasons for this are not
entirely clear, but we suspect that frictions such as information asymmetries and strategic concerns
tend to prevent such trades. The incumbent label has private information about the artist, so the
usual adverse selection problems will inhibit the trading of artist’s catalogs; and from a strategic
perspective, incumbent labels are unlikely to sell an artist’s catalog if doing so facilitates the entry
of a ﬁrm that will become its competitor in the market for music and in the market for new artists.
The forward spillover implies that the recording rights to the new album and future albums need
to be bundled when the new album is released. Investments in new albums yield returns on future
albums, both from the fan base generated by the ﬁrst album (i.e., consumer learning), and from
the information about the artist’s quality that is generated by the ﬁrst album (i.e., ﬁrm learning).
If the album rights are not bundled, these returns will not be fully captured by the investing label:
other labels can free-ride and selectively bid for new albums by artists whose previous albums did
well. Hence, in the absence of a long-term contract, the artist will be able to capture some of those
investment returns. This is the familiar holdup problem. It reduces the willingness of the label
to invest in a new album, leading to underinvestment (and possibly no investment) in that album.
Long-term contracts resolve the holdup problem. Our estimates of the backward spillover imply
that forward spilloversare important,and consequentlythatthe holdupproblem issubstantial. This
helps explain why virtuallyall contracts between artists and labels are initiallylong-term contracts.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists(AFTRA) have repeatedly lobbied Congress to end long-termcontracting, as was
28doneinthemovieindustryinthe1940s(see Tervi¨ o(2004)). Ourresultssuggestthateliminatingthe
label’s option to extend the terms of the contract for more albums would likely lead to signiﬁcant
inefﬁciencies. Fewer albums would be produced, and a higher proportion of the albums would be
by established artists.
In practice, artists may not be able to commit to a long-term contract. Contract terms are almost al-
ways renegotiated after an artist has a successful album. Artists gain bargaining leverage following
a hit album because outside labels are willing to pay for the next album. The artist can exploit this
leverage by strategically withholding or delaying new recordings, or by (with the help of a lawyer)
getting out of a recording contract.32 The outcomes of the renegotiations provide further evidence
of the importance of the backward spillover. Artists almost always stay with their incumbent la-
bels. In our sample, fewer than 10% of artists ever switched between major labels, and most of the
observed switches were due to termination by the incumbent label. Furthermore, artists who ne-
gotiate “reversions” in their initial contracts—i.e., clauses stipulating that the rights to the masters
revert to the artist after some number of years—typically lease their catalogs to the record label
that is producing and distributingtheir current albums. Note that even when the catalog albums did
poorly, and the artist has no bargaining leverage, the incumbent label still often exercises its option
to produce another album. Backward spillovers help rationalize this fact: the incumbent label may
still ﬁnd it worthwhile to invest in another album (even though the outside label does not) because
of the spillover onto catalog.
The structure of the contract also suggests that the parties anticipate the lack of commitment. If
the artist could commit, the parties should sign a long-term contract in which the label is the
residual claimant to album revenues, and the artist receives an up-front fee for each album, with
the fee being contingent on the success of previous albums. In fact, the standard contract gives
the artist royalties (usually between 10-14%) but requires her to repay advances out of royalties.
The royalties are a potential source of inefﬁciency, since a label will underinvest if it has to share
album revenues with the artist. However, artists almost never repay their accumulated advances
to the labels—so in practice the royalties are not a problem.33 We conjecture that the repayment
32Our description of contracting practices in this section is based largely on conversations with Don Engel, one of
the more successful lawyers who specializes in renegotiating contracts. His press pseudonym is “Busta Contract.”
33Recoupment of advances means that, for example, if the royalty rate is 12% and the advance is $200,000, the
album has to generate 1.67 million dollars in revenue (approximately 100,000 CD sales) before the label shares rev-
enues with the artist. If an artist’s advances from previous albums are still unrecouped from her royalty revenues on
that album, then the remaining debt (plus any additional advances) is recoverable from royalties on the new album.
29of advances is due to the artist’s inability to commit not to hold up the label by renegotiating her
contract. By promising ex ante to repay some fraction of the advance from revenues of the current
and future albums, the parties are able to write a contract in which ex post transfers between the
artist and label are contingent on album sales, which are veriﬁable and hence contractible.
8 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that the backward spillover is on average positive, substantial, and permanent. The mag-
nitude of the backward spillover is strongly related to the relative success of the catalog and new
release—the largest spillovers occur when the new album is the artist’s ﬁrst hit. The incidence
of the backward spillover also varies geographically: although artists sell roughly twice as many
albums in their home markets as in other markets, the backward spillover is signiﬁcantly smaller
in home markets. These ﬁndings strongly suggest that new albums are informative events, creating
consumer awareness and generating signals that cause many consumers to re-evaluate their prior
decisions not to buy catalog albums.
The presence of uninformed consumers implies a role for advertising. Indeed, Goeree [15] shows
that advertising is important in the market for PCs, where she argues that the rapid pace of tech-
nological change leads consumers to be less than fully informed about the set of available prod-
ucts. Similarly, Ackerberg’s studies of yogurt purchases suggest that advertising’s inﬂuence stems
largely from its ability to inform “inexperienced” consumers. In the present context, our interpreta-
tion of the backward spillovers raises the possibility that similar sales increases might be obtained
through direct advertising—i.e., with respect to promoting catalog sales, marketing expenditures
may be a substitute for new album releases. However, it is unlikely that spillover sales could be
generated from advertising alone. The reason is that radio airplay seems to be the most important
form of promotion, and the primary channel through which consumers learn about new music.
This means that record labels cannot simply buy consumer awareness—at least not legally. It also
implies that skewness in music sales partly reﬂects skewness in airplay. Verifying this hypothesis
with data on airplay is an exercise we leave for future research.
Since successful artists usually obtain higher advances, over 95% of recording artists are unrecouped, so the label
effectively earns 100% of the marginal revenues from album sales.
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32Table 1: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
N Mean Std. Dev. .10 .50 .90
Date of release:
album 1 355 13may1996 102 22aug1993 05may1996 28feb1999
2 355 20jul1998 108 23jul1995 02aug1998 27may2001
3 178 03jun1999 90 13oct1996 04aug1999 05aug2001
4 74 08jan2000 73 19apr1998 09feb2000 28oct2001
overall
First year sales:
album 1 355 312,074 755,251 7,381 78,360 781,801
2 355 367,103 935,912 10,705 55,675 951,956
3 178 450,716 867,630 7,837 71,674 1,461,214
4 74 316,335 579,869 6,137 87,898 912,078
overall 962 358,362 836,366 8,938 68,059 976,853
First 4 weeks / First year:
album 1 355 .121 .111 .0161 .0846 .265
2 355 .263 .137 .0855 .263 .441
3 178 .305 .131 .134 .305 .5
4 74 .312 .144 .119 .294 .523
overall 962 .222 .15 .0341 .208 .431
Peak sales week:
album 1 355 31.9 47.8 0 15 87
2 355 7.83 23.1 0 0 28
3 178 4.05 13.1 0 0 12
4 74 5.42 16.6 0 0 19
overall 962 15.8 35.3 0 1 44
Weeks between releases:
1 & 2 355 114 53.5 58 107 179
2 & 3 178 111 46.7 58 104 169
3 & 4 74 93.1 36.8 50 88 154
33Table 2: Seasonality in release dates
Percent of releases occurring
Album 1 Album 2 Album 3 Album 4 Overall
Month (n=355) (n=355) (n=178) (n=74) (n=962)
Jan 3.94 3.10 3.37 2.70 3.43
Feb 8.17 4.23 3.93 1.35 5.41
Mar 13.24 9.58 11.80 10.81 11.43
Apr 9.01 8.45 8.99 6.76 8.63
May 11.83 9.01 7.30 8.11 9.67
Jun 7.61 12.68 6.74 14.86 9.88
Jul 8.45 9.01 10.11 10.81 9.15
Aug 11.55 9.58 10.67 12.16 10.71
Sep 7.32 11.27 11.80 14.86 10.19
Oct 12.39 10.70 16.29 6.76 12.06
Nov 5.92 11.83 6.74 5.41 8.21
Dec 0.56 0.56 2.25 5.41 1.25
34Table 3: Determinants of elapsed time between releases
Elapsed time between:
1 and 2 2 and 3 3 and 4
First six months’ sales -0.006 -0.003 0.018
(0.014) (0.011) (0.029)
Decline rate (prev. album) -0.017 0.078 0.117
(0.049) (0.078) (0.150)
Rap -0.075 0.113 0.715
(0.138) (0.212) (0.319)
Country 0.774 0.406 0.404
(0.164) (0.210) (0.312)
Years since 1993 0.082 0.165 0.214
(0.031) (0.057) (0.099)
N 355 177 74
log likelihood -1715.07 -737.83 -243.06
Estimated coefﬁcients from Cox proportional hazard models, with standard
errors in parentheses. A positive coefﬁcient means that an increase in the
correspondingcovariate is associated with an increased hazard rate (i.e.,
shorter time between releases). The estimation does not include
right-censored observations—i.e., artists for whom the next album was not
released before the end of our sample period.
35Table 4: Estimated Effects of New Releases on Sales of Catalog Albums
Week (relative Baseline model (1) First-differenced model (2)
to release date) 2→13 →24 →32 →13 →24 →3
t=-13 -0.006 0.041 -0.008 -0.024 0.041 0.011
(0.017) (0.025) (0.041) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-12 0.022 0.013 0.051 0.010 -0.029 0.051
(0.022) (0.032) (0.049) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-11 0.044 -0.048 -0.012 0.012 -0.060 -0.056
(0.025) (0.035) (0.053) (0.017) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-10 0.059 0.024 0.044 0.010 0.073 0.058
(0.028) (0.037) (0.055) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-9 0.066 0.052 0.068 -0.000 0.031 0.022
(0.029) (0.039) (0.056) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-8 0.078 0.055 0.086 0.008 0.011 0.026
(0.030) (0.040) (0.056) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-7 0.124 0.074 0.050 0.044 0.029 -0.017
(0.031) (0.040) (0.056) (0.017) (0.024) (0.040)
t=-6 0.148 0.090 0.071 0.022 0.028 0.037
(0.031) (0.041) (0.057) (0.017) (0.024) (0.039)
t=-5 0.201 0.121 0.079 0.054 0.038 0.018
(0.032) (0.041) (0.057) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-4 0.260 0.177 0.121 0.057 0.060 0.042
(0.032) (0.042) (0.058) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-3 0.301 0.242 0.146 0.042 0.073 0.023
(0.033) (0.042) (0.058) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=-2 0.346 0.257 0.242 0.050 0.022 0.092
(0.033) (0.042) (0.058) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=-1 0.419 0.332 0.231 0.079 0.089 -0.012
(0.033) (0.042) (0.059) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=0 0.471 0.361 0.273 0.055 0.040 0.045
(0.033) (0.043) (0.059) (0.017) (0.024) (0.041)
t=1 0.449 0.311 0.290 -0.018 -0.038 0.015
(0.034) (0.043) (0.059) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=2 0.443 0.310 0.188 -0.007 0.003 -0.107
(0.034) (0.043) (0.060) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=3 0.425 0.286 0.247 -0.026 -0.023 0.057
(0.034) (0.043) (0.060) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=4 0.455 0.271 0.158 0.018 -0.014 -0.085
(0.034) (0.043) (0.060) (0.016) (0.025) (0.040)
t=5 0.455 0.254 0.252 -0.019 -0.022 0.102
(0.034) (0.044) (0.061) (0.016) (0.024) (0.040)
t=6 0.492 0.277 0.225 0.013 0.019 -0.034
(0.034) (0.044) (0.060) (0.016) (0.025) (0.040)
t=7 0.509 0.263 0.189 -0.003 -0.021 -0.050
(0.035) (0.044) (0.061) (0.017) (0.025) (0.040)
(continued next page)Table 4: (continued)
Week (relative Baseline model (1) First-differenced model (2)
to release date) 2→13 →24 →32 →13 →24 →3
t=8 0.516 0.273 0.197 -0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.035) (0.044) (0.061) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=9 0.474 0.268 0.195 -0.050 -0.014 -0.006
(0.035) (0.044) (0.061) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=10 0.490 0.312 0.180 0.014 0.029 -0.007
(0.035) (0.044) (0.062) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=11 0.489 0.339 0.155 -0.003 0.015 -0.007
(0.035) (0.045) (0.062) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=12 0.495 0.336 0.132 -0.007 -0.022 -0.017
(0.035) (0.045) (0.063) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=13 0.530 0.289 0.173 0.023 -0.051 0.029
(0.035) (0.045) (0.063) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=14 0.562 0.299 0.142 0.021 0.015 -0.053
(0.035) (0.045) (0.064) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=15 0.530 0.255 0.219 -0.037 -0.027 0.056
(0.036) (0.045) (0.064) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=16 0.517 0.244 0.188 -0.013 -0.002 -0.035
(0.036) (0.046) (0.064) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=17 0.533 0.213 0.144 0.019 -0.017 -0.047
(0.036) (0.046) (0.064) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=18 0.532 0.223 0.064 -0.003 0.013 -0.065
(0.036) (0.046) (0.065) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=19 0.545 0.161 0.231 0.007 -0.060 0.176
(0.036) (0.046) (0.065) (0.016) (0.025) (0.042)
t=20 0.561 0.172 0.220 0.008 0.014 -0.003
(0.037) (0.047) (0.066) (0.016) (0.025) (0.041)
t=21 0.515 0.178 0.222 -0.050 0.005 0.004
(0.037) (0.047) (0.066) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041)
t=22 0.547 0.168 0.254 0.030 -0.009 0.029
(0.037) (0.047) (0.066) (0.016) (0.024) (0.040)
t=23 0.561 0.183 0.139 0.010 0.019 -0.114
(0.037) (0.047) (0.067) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
t=24 0.566 0.154 0.222 -0.007 -0.027 0.055
(0.037) (0.047) (0.067) (0.016) (0.025) (0.042)
t=25 0.581 0.137 0.179 0.001 -0.013 -0.067
(0.037) (0.047) (0.068) (0.017) (0.025) (0.042)
# albums 338 173 74 338 173 74
# observations 33,581 17,073 6,281 33,509 17,038 6,270
ˆ ρ .800 .736 .637 -.220 -.270 -.266
Estimates of the regressions described in equations 1 and 2, with standard errors in parentheses
corrected for heteroskedasticity across albums and autocorrelation within albums. Estimated
coefﬁcients for time and seasonal dummies are suppressed to save space. Each column represents an
album pair: e.g., the column labeled 3→2 lists the estimated effects of album 3’s release on the sales
of album 2. t =0is the ﬁrst week following the release of the new album. The ˆ ρ’s are the estimated
AR(1) coefﬁcients, reﬂecting the degree of serial correlation in demand shocks for a given album.Table 5: Spillovers and hits
Album 1, Album 2: Hit, Hit Hit, Not Not, Hit Not, Not
N 53 45 34 206
Median # weeks to release 2 108 124 101 104
Median weekly sales (album 1) prior to release: 1,888 318 342 154
Median weekly decline around release: -0.021 -0.018 -0.018 -0.011
Estimated total change in sales: 22,161 660 14,557 883
Percentage change in sales: 42.7 7.2 148.5 17.6
Average of (sales before next release)/(ﬁrst 4 years’ sales): 0.73 0.85 0.55 0.62
Album 2, Album 3: Hit, Hit Hit, Not Not, Hit Not, Not
N 49 13 12 99
Median # weeks to release 3 105 117 95 103
Median weekly sales (album 1) prior to release: 1,555 466 844 85
Median weekly decline around release: -0.013 -0.026 0.004 -0.010
Estimated total change in sales: 19,884 1,110 20,788 687
Percentage change in sales: 40.6 9.5 56.4 24.6
Average of (sales before next release)/(ﬁrst 4 years’ sales): 0.73 0.84 0.59 0.65
Hits are deﬁned as albums that sold over 250,000 units nationally in the ﬁrst year. Albums that didn’t clear
this threshold are the “Not” albums (i.e., not hits). The estimated total changes and percentage changes in
sales reﬂect increases over the 39-week treatment window.
Table 6: Sales and spillovers in the artist’s home market
2→13 →24 →3
Home market (ˆ ψ) 0.814 0.647 0.689
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Home market × new release period (ˆ γ) -0.105 -0.104 -0.137
(0.010) (0.013) (0.018)
# observations 2,727,890 1,437,340 536,400
# artists 268 142 63
Estimates of the regression model described in equation (3); the dependent variable is log
sales. ˆ ψ measures the average difference in log sales between the artist’s home market vs.
other markets, and ˆ γ measures the average difference in the backward spillover in the
artist’s home market vs. other markets. Other coefﬁcients are omitted to save space.
38Table 7: (First month’s sales)/(First year’s sales): Summary statistics by hit pattern
Percentiles
N Mean Std. Dev. .10 .50 .90
Album 1:
Hits 98 .100 .135 .005 .050 .345
Non-hits 240 .129 .100 .022 .104 .265
Album 2:
Hits following hits: 53 .271 .158 .093 .219 .508
Non-hits following hits: 45 .329 .130 .154 .325 .464
Hits following non-hits: 34 .152 .150 .020 .090 .363
Non-hits following non-hits: 206 .265 .120 .119 .264 .422
Album 3:
Hits following hits: 49 .329 .147 .137 .302 .541
Non-hits following hits: 13 .380 .094 .218 .403 .465
Hits following non-hits: 12 .184 .157 .028 .139 .333
Non-hits following non-hits: 99 .298 .114 .149 .298 .452
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